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I. INTRODUCTION 
The security of information within computer systems is a major issue for system 
automation professionals of the 1990’s. The disclosure of sensitive information, the 
modification of valuable data files, and the disruption of service, by both authorized and 
unauthorized personnel, have plagued system administrators for many years. Today, with 
the advent of interactive network computing and the “information superhighway”, 
information has to be protected more than ever. 
Security issues have been a concern in the national security and defense establishments 
since the dawn of the computer age. National defense mandated major requirements for 
security in the development and acquisition of automated computer systems. Work by 
government personnel and defense contractors brought about the development of 
systematic criteria for measuring the effectiveness and trustworthiness of security 
mechanisms within computer systems. These “criteria” became the Trusted Computer 
Security Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly called the “Orange Book.” The TCSEC 
is the metric by which the United States Government measures the security effectiveness 
of an automated computer system.* 
This thesis will be an attempt to conduct a comparative analysis of selected security 
features of two leading U.S. database management system (DBMS) products, (Trusted 
ORACLE 7.0 and INFORMIX On-Line/Secure 5.0), against the TCSEC. 
A method of analysis will be presented which is based on mapping decomposed 
TCSEC criteria (and interpretations to the Criteria) to the database through a detailed 
analysis of each product’s documentation and users’ manuals. This method could be 
applied to assist in the analysis of any DBMS software product. It  should be noted, that this 
1 .  Other countries, such as C‘uada (and the European community have their own criteria for mea- 
suring the security effectiveness of computer systems. 
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protected from modification by others, and that the information or computer resources are 
always available to them. Simply put, computer security focuses on secrecy, integrity, and 
denial of service. 
The Privacy Act of 1974 and the Computer Security Act of 1987, which mandated that 
information be protected in automated information systems, is a driving force for both 
government and private industry to secure the data contained within there computer 
systems. 
1. Security Objectives 
The following sections further define the notion of what computer security is by 
additionally defining the three components: secrecy, integrity, and denial of service. 
a. Secrecy 
The secrecy component of security has been a prime focus of U.S. 
Government funded programs since the early 1970’s. [GASS88] The objective is to protect 
the secrecy of classified information and government secrets. Because of the U.S. 
government’s profound interest in secrecy, this aspect of computer security is well 
researched and studied by computer scientists [AMOR94]. Secrecy is intended to prevent 
the “leakage” of information from authorized users to unauthorized users. 
b. Integrity 
The integrity component of security covers the unauthorized modification 
of information stored in computer systems. Only authorized users of the system with the 
proper access to information should be able to alter (i.e., write, delete, append) data within 
the computer. If any other users change the information, then an integrity violation has 
occurred.(Note that authorized users of the system can still make erroneous changes to 
information and this would not be a integrity violation.) 
Integrity of data has been a primary issue in the commercial business 
environment, with secrecy taking a secondary role [GASS88][AMOR94]. Businesses were 
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cleaner more reliable architecture.[GASS88] Hardware security is included in a computer 
system’s evaluation, and may only be a peripheral consideration during a DBMS evaluation 
(or other application evaluation). The hardware and the operating system provide the 
“platform” on which the DBMS, (as well as other application programs) operate on. 
b. Operating System Security 
The second layer of security in a secure computing system is found at the 
operating system (0s) level. Access to objects (i.e., information containers having labels) 
is a primary focus of 0s security. Discretionary and nondiscretionary access controls are 
present in most secure operating systems. Some operating systems have been developed 
which utilize a security kernel, which gives high assurance that a particular security policy 
is enforced. Many operating system products have been evaluated by the NSA since 1982 
(the year evaluations began) [CHOK92]. Due to the system architecture of current DBMS 
implementations, certain security features of the 0s (discretionary access controls and 
mandatory access controls on files and directories, for example) have to be explored when 
analyzing a DBMS product. 
c. Database Security 
A database management system (DBMS) is a complex software system 
designed to manipulate, store, and “manage” large amounts of raw data. Today’s DBMSs 
are complicated, consisting of tens to hundreds of thousands of lines of code. Part of their 
specification requirements mandate them to provide for security and integrity of data. 
These security features are in addition to the security features provided by the underlying 
operating system. 
The chief security features of standard (i.e., untrusted) database systems are 
account creation, account privileges, stored procedures and views, and audit logs. The more 
sophisticated DBMS products provide these and other more sophisticated mechanisms, 
while some of the lower-end products (such as PC based DBMS products) provide little or 
no security features at all. 
which underlies both DBMS’s. Chapters V and VI discuss the general architecture and 
operations of Trusted ORACLE and On-Line/Secure, respectively. The method of security 
analysis is presented in Chapter VII, and the detailed analysis for Trusted ORACLE and 
Informix-OnLine/Secure are presented in Chapters VIII and IX, respectively. A 
comparative analysis is presented in Chapter X, and conclusions, recommendations and 
future research are addressed in Chapter XI. 
E. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
All information for this thesis was gathered from the open literature, interviews, and 
marketing documents. No special agreements have been arranged with the vendors or the 
evaluators for the disclosure of information about their respective software products. 
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tables, etc.) at different classifications. A system which processes data at many different 
levels and whose users are also classified at many different levels is called a multilevel 
system (MLS). When a computer system must be responsible for access mediation, an 
evaluated system provides a level of assurance that access control policy is correctly 
enforced. 
B. THE REFERENCE MONITOR CONCEPT 
To address the multilevel sharing issue a new way of doing business was needed, so in 
the late 1960’s serious work began to address this problem. Early experiences with 
computer security were characterized by “Tiger teams”3 which went out and tried to 
penetrate a computer system’s defense. Once the team penetrated the system controls and 
“broke into” the computer, another team of computer scientists would fix the holes 
discovered by the Tiger teams. This early method of computer security has been referred 
to as the “penetrate and patch” approach; systems were tested to uncover flaws, and the 
penetration paths uncovered were then patched. [NCSC92a] This process of discovering 
problems led to even more problems and soon a system became heavily patched with 
“spaghetti code” intended to prevent unauthorized users from entering the system without 
permission. This “penetrate and patch” methodology is unreliable because no one can 
decide when any more flaws exist. This was no way to establish that a system was secure. 
A more general approach was needed. 
A research project performed on behalf of the DOD [ANDE72] produced the reference 
monitor concept in the early 1970’s. In this concept of “a reference monitor which enforces 
the authorized access relationships between subjects and objects of a system” [DOD85], a 
fundamentally new approach to the multilevel sharing issue was formulated. The Anderson 
Report [ANDE72] described the architectural framework needed for dealing with the 
mediation of access in the face of potentially hostile users. [NCSC92a] 
3. Tiger teams ;ue teauns of  computer scientists who simulate adversruies or threats. and try to pen- 





Authorization I Database 
Figure 1: The Reference Monitor Concept 
In Figure 1, Subject A is given permission to access (read) Object A. This is because 
Subject A’s label (TOP SECRET) dominates (is greater than) Object A’s label (SECRET). 
However, in the case of Subject B, its label (SECRET) is dominated by Object B’s label 
(TOP SECRET) and is denied permission to access. A complete audit trail may be kept on 
all access attempts by writing to an audit database or audit file. 
The reference monitor has become the general solution to the multilevel sharing 
problem. It is the most often used approach for building secure operating systems 
[GASSM] and represents an ideal approach for building access control features within 
trusted DBMSs. Before a discussion on how the reference monitor concept is implemented 
to control access to data and to resources (objects) by users (both authorized and 
unauthorized), the notion of a subject and an object is presented in the next section. 
1 1  
database objects, and object identification. This area is especially important in the area of 
DBMS evaluations and has been the topic of some discussion in the context of DBMS 
objects versus operating system objects [GRAUW]. 
An object is defined as a “passive entity that contains or receives information. “Access 
to an object potentially implies access to the information it contains. Examples of objects 
are: records, blocks, pages, segments, files, directories, directory trees, programs, bits, 
bytes, words, fields, processors, video displays, keyboards, clocks, printers, and network 
nodes.”[ DOD851 
An object can be thought of as a container, like a bucket, which can hold data. This 
bucket can be filled up (written to in the computer vernacular) and/or drained (read from) 
by the active processes (subjects, as previously discussed) in the system. However, this is 
a special bucket, when you drain it, the data inside does not really move at all, so no data 
is ever lost when the bucket is drained. In the technical sense, this object is a repository of 
data, which has an internal state that is changed (written) and/or observed (read) by the 
subjects of the computer system [NCSC89]. All state changes of the object are initiated by 
a set of well-defined operations that are available to the subjects[NCSCt39]. One could call 
this category of objects “data objects”, or one could categorize them as storage objects or 
named objects, depending upon how they are created and managed by the TCB. (See 
sec tion below.) 
1. Object Categories 
Data objects can be thought of as containers which hold data and is a broad 
category in which to classify objects. One way to classify objects is by their physical 
properties, such as memory blocks or segments. Another useful way that we can classify 
objects is by the way in which subjects can access them [NCSC89]. In the context of 
DBMSs, if subjects can access objects through discretionary access controls, these objects 
are called “named objects.” If subjects can access objects through mandatory access 
controls, then these objects are called “storage objects.” [NCSC89] 
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be in a “privileged mode”. A process operating in a privileged mode can access more of the 
memory address space (i.e., more objects), or it can invoke special system functions. 
For example, the person who operates and maintains the computer system is called the 
system administrator. The system administrator usually requires special privileges to keep 
the computer system running correctly. 
Another example of a special privilege is a system’s backup and recovery program. 
The backup program will be allowed to bypass read restrictions on files so it can copy them 
to a magnetic tape or a floppy disk; the recovery program will be allowed to bypass write 
restrictions on files so it can write files and restore them to original form.[GASS88] 
1. Least Privilege 
This notion of different privileges given to  the processes running in the system 
was inspired by the principle of least privilege. Least privilege is the concept that users 
(subjects)be granted only as many resources as they need to complete their job. The Orange 
Book defines least privilege explicitly as: 
... that each subject in a system be granted the most restrictive set of privileges (or 
lowest clearance) needed for the performance of authorized tasks. “The application of 
this principle limits the damage that can result from accident, error, or unauthorized 
use.[DOD85] 
The idea is to reduce the number of potential interactions between programs to 
the minimum amount needed for correct operation, so that if erroneous input is introduced 
by users or improper functions are called, the amount of damage to the system will be 
minimized. [SALT751 
2. Modes of Execution 
The concept of modes of execution is crucial for the enforcement of least 
privilege. A mode of execution (or domain of execution) is the environment in which a 
process (subject) operates, and contains all those resources (objects) for which it has access. 
The Intel’s iAPX xX6 CPU, can operate in four modes. Assuming the programmers 
1s 
Jser Applications 
Figure 2: Hierarchial Domains or Rings 
When a process executes, its respective subjects (a process may have more than 
one subject) operate within a predetermined ring or domain. A domain represents all the 
objects to which the subject has access (read or write). A subject’s domain at any particular 
time might include a variety of programs, files, data segments, and I/O devices such as 












Figure 3: Domain of Execution 
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the set of rules, directives, and practices that regulate how an organization 
manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information.[DOD85] 
The security policy describes every aspect of how information will be handled both 
inside the system and outside the system. Sensitive information is defined and could 
include everything from government TOP SECRET documents to a small company’s 
proprietary business information or its personnel database. The security policy, once 
defined, is then translated into a security implementation within the computer system. The 
desired attributes of the system are eventually realized, in part, by the implementation of 
some specific set of mechanisms; functions which can be shown to provide the required 
attributes. [NCSC92a] The critical point is that one starts with a security policy (i.e., a high- 
level statement of the desired global properties or characteristics of the system), then 
proceeds through a number of refinement steps culminating with a set of specific 
implementations. [NCSC92a] See “SECURITY IMPLEMENTATIONS” on page 26. 
1. Security Models 
The security policy of a computing system can vary from short (i.e., no person 
outside the company should access this data) to extremely complex (e.g., U.S. Government 
TOP SECRET information systems). Formal security policies have been proposed and 
formulated into security models for several years. Both single-level and multi-level 
security tnodels exist, but for the purposes of this thesis, only multi-level security models 
are of interest. In the multi-level world, multi-level security models, where many different 
objects and subjects of different classification are present, is our focus. 
a. Military Security Model 
We start with the military security model because most secure computer 
systems used by the defense and national security establishments are based on this model. 
This model also represents the base upon which many other important multilevel security 
models are built (Le., the Bell-LaPadula Model). 
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information. These compartments are then used to enforce the need-to-know principle, so 
that users can obtain access only to information which is relevant to their jobs. Examples 
of compartments are TERRORISTS, NUCLEAR, and SPIES. A single piece of 
information would then be coded with zero or more compartments, depending on the 
categories to which the information applies (see Figure 5) .  For a person to gain access to a 
piece of inforination, he/she must possess all the compartments associated with the 
information, as well as a sensitivity classification that dominates the label of the 
information. For example, if Captain Smith wants TOP SECRET information that deals 
with nuclear spies and terrorists, he must have a security rating of at least TOP SECRET 
and compartment clearances for NUCLEAR, SPIES, and TERRORISTS. (See row 1 of 
Figure 5) Clearances in rows 2-5 (Figure 5) would not be adequate to gain the desired 
information. 
1. TOP SECRET:NUCLEAR,SPIES,TERRORISTS 
2. SECRET: SPIES 
3. SECRET: TERRORISTS 
4. CONFIDENTIAL: NUCLEAR 
5. UNCLASSIFIED: 
Figure 5: Military Security Labels 
b. Bell-LaPadula Model 
One of the best known and most popular multilevel security models is the 
Bell and LaPadula model developed and published by D. Bell and L. LaPadula in 1973. 
[BELL731 The Bell-LaPadula model (BLP) describes the allowable paths of access control 
in a secure system. The goal of the model is to identify allowable communication channels 
where it is important to maintain secrecy. (Note that this model does not preserve the 
integrity of the information).The model has been used to define the security requirements 
for systems concurrently handling data at different sensitivity levels. [PFLE89] This model 
21 
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Figure 6: The Bell-LaPadula Model demonstrating 
the secure flow of information [PFLES9] 
The simple security property means that a subject can read objects at its 
security classification and below. For example, a SECRET subject can read SECRET, 
CONFIDENTIAL, and UNCLASSIFIED data. 
The *-property of the Bell-LaPadula model is used to prevent write-down, 
so that a subject with a high classification (which has access to high-level information 
objects) cannot copy information into a lower level object. (See flow demonstrated in 
Figure 6 in heavy black box; this is not allowed.) This is synonymous with the military 
security model, which prevents persons with TOP SECRET clearances to give TOP 
SECRET information away to UNCLASSIFIED users. 
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Discretionary access control permits the owner of an object, such as a file, 
to authorize access to that object by other subjects in the system. This creator, at hidher 
own discretion, determines who is authorized to access the objects he/she creates. 
Discretionary access control is best demonstrated by way of an access control matrix. 
Subject filea file b file c he1p.t 
USERA orw orw orw r 
USER B r r 
USERC rw r 
USER D r r 
sys mgr rw 
c. Access Control Matrix 
The access control matrix is a table in which each row represents a subject, 
each column represents an object, and each entry is the set of access rights for that subject 
to that object. [PFLEW] This matrix may in fact be sparse because not every row and 
column intersection will have an entry; most subjects will not have access rights to most 
objects. In Table 1 below, an access control matrix is shown; objects are shown in the 
double-boxed columns and subjects represent rows. The allowable modes of operation (i.e., 
rights) for each subject are: o (owner), r (read), w (write), x (execute). (Note that some 
boxes are blank). 
compiler linker clock printer 
X X r W 
X X r W 
r X r W 
X X r W 
ox ox orw 0 
TABLE 1: ACCESS CONTROL MATRIX 
Because the access matrix can be represented as a list of triples (subject, 
object, rights), searching a large number of triples can be time consuming and inefficient. 
Therefore, the access control matrix is used more as an abstraction than a real 
implementations. 
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the rights to declare who has what access and to revoke access by any person whenever 
desired. Each user has a file directory, which lists all the files to which that user has access. 
The UNIX operating system’s file ownership and permissions are a good 
example of this directory type implementation, and as discussed earlier, of discretionary 
access control. UNIX implements a very simple mechanism which uses only a few bits of 
access control information attached to each file, Every file has an owner who created that 
file. The files created by the owner are so listed with that ownership, and file permissions, 
or modes, are associated with that particular file. A total of ten bits are used to indicate 
which permissions are applied to three different entities: user (owner), group, and others. 
Each entity can have permission to read (r), write (w), or execute (e) the file as a program. 
See Figure 7 below. 




special file type 
y owner 
Figure 7: UNIX Protection System 
A dash indicates that a permission is not enabled. The left most bit is used to 
indicate a special file type, like ‘d’ for directory. Typical files wiII have a dash in this 
location. 
2. Access Control List System 
Another access control mechanism and one of the most effective access control 
schemes is the access control list (ACL) [GASS88]. In this implementation every object 
27 
r 
I H. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE 
We have now traversed to the point where we must now place within the system the 
security mechanisms we have implemented (i.e., protected directories, ACLs, capabilities, 
etc.). The location where we placed the security mechanisms is inside a perimeter we call 
the trusted computing base. The trusted computing base (TCB) has been defined by the 
the totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system, including 
hardware, firmware, and software, the combination of which is responsible for 
enforcing a security policy. “A TCB consists of one or more components that together 
enforce a unified security policy over a product or system. [DODXS] 
The TCB contains all the necessary mechanisms needed to provide for the security of 
the computing system in accordance with the defined security policy. The incorrect 
operation of the mechanisms within the TCB could lead to the unauthorized disclosure of 
information or another security violation relative to the system’s security policy. 
To further define and develop this notion of the TCB, the boundaries of the system 
must be identified. Two boundaries are of importance as discussed in [GASSXX] are the 
system boundary and the security boundary. 
1. System Boundary 
The computer system’s boundary or interface with the outside world, must be 
clearly defined, and the threats from the outside world must be identified and evaluated 
before a security policy can be developed. The system is composed of all the computing 
hardware, firmware, and software, and includes all the telecommunication hardware and 
software as well (i.e., networks, phone-lines, wireless, etc.). Everything identified as being 
inside or part of the system, must be protected by the system. Everything outside the system 
is left unprotected by the system. [GASS88] The threats to the system must be made a 
primary focus during the security plan development. [GASS88] 
within the security perimeter must be precisely defined, because once they malfunction, a 
security violation can occur. 
This interface, called the security boundary, must be well defined just like the 
system boundary interface. [GASSM] This interface is controlled and enforced by the 
system’s security relevant components. In a system which utilizes a security kernel, the list 
of system calls between the security kernel and the operating system is a good example of 
the interface between the two components of the system. In Figure 9 below, the system’s 
hardware, security kernel, a portion of the OS, and a portion of the DBMS comprise the 
TCB. (Builders of secure systems try to minimize the size of the TCB to make validation 
easier.) The users of the system are outside the system and the external controls prevent 
known threats from entering the system. The TCB is maintained by the security relevant 
components of the system and is responsible for all security decisions. 
Outside the system I Users I 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Untrusted part of the 
system (Outside Security Perimeter: 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -  
TCB - Inside the 
Security Perimeter 
(Denoted b heavy 
black lines1 
t t t t - - - -  
DBMS 
Applications 0s -1-1 Applications part Un rusted 
Security Kernel 
Hardware 
Figure 9: System Boundaries and the Trusted Computing Base 
The TCB and the internal security controls, which comprise the TCB, are the 
primary focus of the design and evaluation of trusted systems. 
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I  
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Figure 10: TCB Subset Architecture 
An advantage of the TCB subsetting approach is that it allows vendors building 
an upper level TCB to take advantage of the security features provided from the lower TCB 
upon which they build their new product. For example, if a trusted operating system 
provides for mandatory security between subjects and objects, then the newly built DBMS 
need only enforce additional discretionary security needed by the database. Thus, building 
multilevel DBMSs using this approach may be the quickest and the most viable approach 
to getting a multilevel DBMS product evaluated. [LUNT92] 
The use of TCB subsetting also can provide the greatest degree of security 
possible for mandatory security.[LUNT92] Because there is no trusted MAC component in 
the DBMS itself, the risk of disclosure of sensitive data is considerably reduced. This is 
because the DBMS is governed by the mandatory TCB of the underlying operating system, 
which partitions inultilevel data by their classification. Thus the subjects within the DBMS, 
when operating on behalf of the users, cannot gain access to any data whose classification 
is not dominated by the users’ clearance. This means that database operations can be 
handled by subjects which are single-level and untrusted with respect to mandatory access 
controls. This is the most conservative approach possible for mandatory security. 
[LUNT92] 
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the trusted subject does not permit unauthorized information flow, as opposed to showing 
that it correctly enforces an access control policy. [NCSC89] 
One disadvantage of the trusted subject methodology is the definition of how the 
trusted subject (i.e., DBMS) is used, because its use can cause new information flows 
beyond those that can be discovered by performing a flow analysis exclusively of the 
trusted subject. Such flows can be discovered only by performing a flow analysis on the 
combination of the trusted subject and the underlying TCB (i.e., the operating system), a 
task which may in and of itself be very difficult to accomplish. 
Over the past decade, as the Criteria have matured (i.e., new interpretations issued) and 
additional publications (i.e., from the Technical Guidelines Program) have emerged, more 
commercial developers have moved towards building secure computer systems. In the 
beginning, manufacturers built systems using the Criteria because it was mandated by the 
U.S. Government. However, now commercial and private companies have realized the 
need to better protect proprietary information, personnel databases, and other private or 
sensitive information. Because of this, the use of trusted systems is becoming more 
widespread outside the government establishment [GASStB]. 
B. HISTORY OF THE TCSEC 
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) is part of the National Security 
Agency (NSA), an agency of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). In January 1981, 
the Department of Defense assigned the responsibility for computer security to the Director 
of the National Security Agency (NSA). This action led to the formation of the Computer 
Security Center, whose charter was promulgated in the DOD Directive 52 15.1 in October 
1982. It specifically tasked the Computer Security Center to establish and maintain: 
technical standards and criteria for the security evaluation of trusted computer 
systems that can be incorporated readily into the Department of Defense component 
life-c ycle man agemen t process. [ N CS C90] 
The NCSC, in conjunction with other components of the NSA (e.g., Information 
Systems Security Organization-ISSO), is involved in establishing computer security 
criteria and guidelines such as the TCSEC, evaluating computer hardware and software 
products for security and assurance against the Criteria, and conducting and supporting 
computer security research and development. 
Before the Computer Security Center was established, two departments of the U.S. 
government were instrumental in the establishment of computer security standards and 
criteria for evaluating computer system products. They were the DOD and the Department 
of Commerce (DOC). 
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C. THE CRITERIA 
The concept of the trusted computing base (TCB) is fundamental to the understanding 
of the TCSEC. (See “TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE” on page 29.) Once the TCB can 
be identified, evaluated, and rated, a level of assurance (rating class) can be given to the 
product and the system can be considered a trusted system. The Criteria contains three basic 
control objectives: security policy, accountability, and assurance. 
1. Security Policy 
The security policy of an organization is the starting point for any 
implementation of external and internal security mechanisms, and is a basic control 
objective of the TCSEC. The security policy must be defined in terms of the perceived 
threats, risks, and goals of an organization [DODt(S]. The people or users of the system 
must be identified, and all the information that will be stored in the system must be located 
and distinguished from non-system information. 
2. Accountability 
Another control objective of the TCSEC is the accountability of subjects, which 
includes I&A and audit capabilities [DOD85]. Each access to a trusted system by a user 
must be mediated by a security control mechanism which correctly identifies individual 
subjects (by authenticating a password or other indelible unique feature) and controls what 
classes of information that subject can access to. A record of all security relevant actions 
(audit record) by the users must be kept so that any responsible party can be traced after a 
system violation has occurred. 
3. Assurance 
Assurance is the guaranteeing or providing of confidence that the security policy 
has been enforced correctly; that the reference validation mechanism does in fact do its job 
accurately by implementing the intent of the security policy. The security mechanisms 
which enforce the security policy must be capable of being “independently evaluated” so 
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(high assurance) are: D, C, B, and A. Overall there are seven different ratings (classes) that 
a product or system can earn; D,C 1 ,C2,B I ,B2,B3,A 1. 
1. Division D (Minimal Protection) 
Division D contains one class (Class D), and is reserved for all computer systems 
or products that have failed to adequately meet the requirements of another higher 
evaluation class. Class D products or systems cannot be expected to protect any security 
policy or even human error. 
2. Division C (Discretionary Protection) 
Division C contains Class C1 and Class C2. These classes provide some 
confidence that the TCB is enforcing a discretionary security policy. The particular items 
of interest are discretionary protection, audit capabilities and verification and testing. 
Tests must be conducted at Class Cl  which verify that the security mechanisms 
(DAC, I&A) work in accordance with the system documentation. A level of assurance must 
be present that a user cannot by-pass or defeat the security mechanisms of the TCB. 
Additionally at Class C2, evidence must be demonstrated that I&A data and the audit data 
cannot be manipulated or destroyed by an unauthorized user. A search for obvious flaws 
must be conducted, so that any violations of resource isolation or unauthorized access to 
audit or authentication data is found. There must be “hands-on” involvement in the conduct 
of independent tests run by the evaluation team. [DOD85] 
3. Division B (Mandatory Protection) 
Division B contains three classes (B 1 ,B2,B3) and introduces several new design 
requirements. Most significantly, this division introduces mandatory access controls, 
labeling of objects and subjects, covert channel analysis, and the requirement that the 
reference monitor concept be utilized in the Class B2 and B3.[DOD85] 
It  is at the Class B2 that serious security concerns are realized. At the lower 
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Figure 11: TCSEC Summary Chart from 
White-Red Book,” Great Britain has the “Green Book” and Canada has the Canadian 
Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC). [TROY92]Since the birth of the 
European community as a political and economic entity, a more coordinated approach of 
defining computer security standards was needed. Four European countries (Germany, 
France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands) combined their resources to create the 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC). [TROY921 
1. European ITSEC 
Because the European community wanted to maintain commonality with the 
U.S., the members chose the TCSEC as a basis and elected to expand it, adding additional 
criteria and more detail. [TROY921 Version 1 of the ITSEC was published in June of 1990, 
and the second version released June 28, 199 1. A number of evaluations have already been 
conducted against the ITSEC, including DBMS evaluations in the United Kingdom. 
2. Canadian TCPEC 
The Canadian Computer Security Establishment (CCSE) published the 
Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) with influences from 
the Orange Book and the ITSEC. 
3. Federal Criteria/Common Criteria 
During the early 1990’s, there began a move to consolidate a common federal 
criteria that would be more in-line with the proposed European ITSEC. The original goal 
of the Federal Criteria project was to create a U.S. national standard for computer and 
information system security that according to [CAMP941 would: 
protect previous investment in trust technology 
add value to current criteria 
develop a framework for defining new customer requirements 
promote international harmonization of criteria 
This standard was intended to provide information on how to specify 
requirements for lnformation Technology product security, to include a fundamental 
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IV. HP-UX BLS OPERATING SYSTEM 
A. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
It  is mandatory that we look at the operating system in our security analysis of “01 i 
Trusted ORACLE and Informix On-Line/Secure. The reason is that the operating system 
is an extremely important subset of the trusted computing base. We have purposely chosen 
a common operating system, HP-UX BLS Version 8.0, so as to both limit the scope of the 
thesis (i.e., now only one operating system must be partially examined, instead of two), and 
to make our comparison of products have a common foundation (i.e., a common 0s). 
1. History 
The UNIX operating system was developed by Ken Thompson of AT&T’s Bell 
Labs in the late 1960’s as a general purpose interactive timesharing system. After further 
refinements by the researchers at Bell Labs, UNIX became widely available in 1975. The 
University of California at Berkeley led the way in making many improvements to the 
system and began releasing their own improved versions called BSD (Berkeley Software 
Distribution). Meanwhile, AT&T continued to make improvements to their original system 
(System V) and thus released many new versions in the years to follow. These two versions, 
Berkeley’s BSD and AT&T’s System V, were in widespread use by the mid 1980’s. 
The standard Hewlett-Packard Unix (HP-UX) is based on and is compatible with 
UNIX System Laboratories (USL’s) UNIX operating system [EDGE93]. USL’s UNIX is 
similar to the Fourth Berkeley Software Distribution Unix software. Therefore, it has many 
of the characteristics of the Berkeley Unix operating system. However, HP-UX B-Level 
Security (BLS) does not support all the functionality of its predecessor, HP-UX. HP-UX 
BLS is a security enhanced version of HP-UX designed to meet the requirements of a Class 
B 1 system [HEWL92a]. 
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TCB includes the processor and l/O internal buses, bus adaptor cards, disk drives, tape 
drives, and printers. 
2. How UNIX Works 
This is a brief overview of how UNIX works as taken from [TANE92]. 
A UNIX system, can be regarded as a kind of pyramid. At the bottom is the 
hardware, consisting of the CPU, memory, disks, terminals, and other devices. 
Running on the bare hardware is the UNIX operating system. Its primary function is 
to control the hardware and provide a system call interface to all application programs. 
These system calls allow user applications to create and manage processes, files, and 
other resources. [TANE92] 
Application programs make system calls by putting arguments in registers and 
issuing trap instructions to switch from user mode to kernel mode to start up UNIX. 
A library is provided, with one procedure per system call. Each procedure first puts its 
arguments in the proper place, then executes the trap instruction. The trap instruction 
performs the required task and then returns to the user mode, where the application 
program is started again. [TANE92] 
The operating system is a resource manager. It performs primitive functions to 
assist the application programs by controlling such things as the processors, memory space, 
and YO devices. 
C. SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS 
As previously noted, HP-UX BLS is a security-enhanced version of the standard HP- 
UX operating system. A number of changes have been implemented to meet the Class B 1 
evaluation requirements. In the following sections, we will give a brief description of some 
of the security features that are implemented in the HP-UX BLS system. 
1. Administrative Roles 
One of the significant changes between standard HP-UX and HP-UX BLS is in 
the area of system administration [HEWL92a]. The system administration tasks have been 
split into a number of logical roles, thereby enforcing the concept of separation of privilege. 
The roles are split into functional areas, thus all of the roles can be given to one individual 
or they can be divided up between different individuals (depending on the needs and the 
TABLE 3: PROTECTED SUBSYSTEMS FROM [HEWL92A] 
Function I I Subsystem I Authorization I 
Authentication Assigns authorization and clearances to 
users auth I 
Audit audit Maintains and analyzes output from the 
system’s auditing functions 
System sysadmin Configures new versions of the operating 
Memory tnem Allows processes to read memory occu- 
Backup backup Maintains and backs up the file system 
Administrator system and tunes the system 
pied by the operating system 
Cron cron Handles the scheduling of jobs on a 
Terminal terminal Controls terminal resources of the system 
delayed or periodic basis 
Line Printer 1P Controls the printer resources of the sys- 
tem. Prints job requests made by users 
Tape tape Controls the data import/export resources 
of the system 
3. LogidLogout 
The HP-UX BLS operating system requires the user requesting access to the 
system to enter hisher login name, password, and sensitivity level. This sensitivity label 
must be equal to, or lower than the user’s clearance (the highest level the user is cleared 
for). The system then replies with the user’s sensitivity level and the data (ie, terminal ID) 
and time of last successful and unsuccessful login attempts. 
The system administrator may select to permit user-defined passwords or may 
require the use of a random password generator. In addition, a password aging function can 
be selected which will prompt the user when it is time to change hisher password. If the 
password expires, then the user’s account will be locked and the system administrator will 
be required to re-enable the account [HEWLY2c]. 
The authorization set, although associated with a user, is stamped on all the 
user’s processes. The above sets restrict users and programs in the use of system calls, and 
they create a mechanism which can be used to implement a policy of least privilege 
[HEWLY2a]. 
ACL Entry 
5. Protecting Files 
Explanation 
Protecting files in HP-UX BLS is similar to the protections found in standard 
UNIX, that is, the use of protection bits. (See “Protected Groups or Directories” on 
page 26.) In addition, because it is necessary to restrict file access to the granularity of a 
single user (which is not found in standard UNIX) to meet the Class B1 assurance level, 
access control lists (ACLs) are utilized in HP-UX BLS. 
The ACLs are structured to provide three entries: user, group, and protection 
specification [HEWL92c]. The use of a special character “*”, called a wildcard, enables 
general access to any user meeting the other requirements. Also, the protection 
specification can use r (read), w (write), x (execute), all (for r, w, e), or null, none, or “--- 




TABLE 5: ACL ENTRIES IN HP-UX BLS FROM [HEWL92C] 
-~~~ 
John, when in group acct, has read access 
Any user, when in group acct, has read access 
but is denied write or execute 
gary. * ,null> 
<*.progs,-> 
Gary, in any group, has no access permission 
Any user in progs group is denied read access 
I <***,---> I Any user in any group is denied access I 
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composed of zero or more nonhierarchical categories, which might include, (in military 
context) NATO, CRYPTO, and NUCLEAR. [HEWL92a] 
7. Import/Export 
HP-UX BLS controls all data imported into and from the system. The import 
medium is the magnetic tape or the floppy diskette; the export medium is the magnetic tape, 
floppy diskette, or printout. All import or export media are labeled or unlabeled. Labeled 
media are labeled with a sensitivity label that is recognized by the system (i.e., the system 
is set up to accept the label). The unlabeled media usually have external stick-on labels (or 
banner pages for a printout) that represent the sensitivity of the information on the medium. 
All import/export devices are designated as either single-level or multilevel 
devices. Single-level devices are associated with a single sensitivity level and all data 
imported into or exported from the system is handled at that level. Multilevel devices can 
determine the sensitivity labels associated with objects imported to or exported from the 
system and then make the appropriate decisions to place the objects (i.e., files) in the correct 
directory or disk drive. (In the case of printout, it will place the correct label on each page 
of the printout by reading the file’s label and then printing it on the respective page.) All 
device information is placed in a security database for retrieval by the access control 
mechanism. 
8. Security Databases 
HP-UX BLS requires the maintenance of several security databases to enforce 
the mandated security policy. (See Table 6 below). The protected subsystems access these 
databases when needed to obtain information for determining access control. The system 
administrator can change the parameters within the databases to suit the appropriate 
security policy. 
All the security databases in Table 6 are self explanatory except for the System 
Defaults database. This database stores default values for the Protected Password, Terminal 
Control, and File Control databases. If the system administrator does not modify these three 
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a. Memory Space Allocation 
Input and output of both HP-UX BLS and Trusted ORACLE are done in 
units of storage called blocks. The size of Oracle blocks must be set by the DBA to enhance 
performance of the DBMS. I t  is recommended that a block size of 2K bytes be utilized upon 
initial installation. (The maximum Oracle block size is 8K).[ORAC92b] 
b. Database and Log Files Size 
The recommended database file size in Trusted ORACLE is 5 MB. A 
minimum of two log files is required per database and lOOK bytes of storage is 
recommended for each file.[ORAC92b] 
c. Filename Restrictions 
Trusted ORACLE limits the length of some filenames to a maximum of 14 
characters. [ORACC)2b] This applies to HP-UX BLS file system when it does not have long 
filenames enabled within the system. 
d. Terminal Characteristics 
Some Trusted ORACLE utility programs (i.e, SQL*Plus) use special 
characters to call files which do not coincide with the characters found in HP-UX BLS. For 
example, the "@" character in Oracle calls an indirect command file; whereas this same 
character in HP-UX BLS is the line kill character default. This character should be 
redefined in Trusted ORACLE to avoid unexpected results. [ORAC92b] 
2. Informix Support 
Informix On-Line/Secure works with several secure operating systems, each of 
which has a slightly different implementation. Informix treats specific operating systems 
as if they are members of the following families: System V MLS, OSF MLS, CMW, and 
System V, version 4 ES. [INFO93b] HP-UX BLS belongs to the Compartmented Mode 
Workstation (CMW) family. 
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V. TRUSTED ORACLE ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter and the one following explain the configuration of the DBMSs and the HP- 
UX BLS operating system. Both systems can be configured in different ways, depending 
upon the choices made by the persons installing the system. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Trusted ORACLE 7 is a Class B1 security enhanced package based on the standard 
Oracle Relational Database Management System, Release 7.0. Therefore, the Trusted 
ORACLE 7 package includes all the features (functionality) of standard Oracle 7, along 
with multilevel security.[DATA94b] 
1. History 
Trusted ORACLE 7 is a distributed server database, first released in 1992. It 
includes all the functionality found in the standard Oracle 6 (its predecessor), plus a number 
of new features including a multi-threaded server, query optimizer, row-level locking, and 
role-based security. [DATA94b] 
2. Platforms Supported 
Standard ORACLE 7 can be installed on more than 88 different computing 
platforms [DATA94b]. However, Trusted ORACLE 7 is supported on only the DEC 
SEVMS and Hewlett-Packard’s HP-UX BLS operating systems. Ultimately, the DBMS 
will be ported to a wide range of secure UNIX and proprietary platforms, including 
Compartmented Mode Workstations, as they become available from hardware and 
operating system vendors [EHRS9 1 1. 
\ I /  
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Figure 11: DBMS MAC Mode Database from [ORAC92a] 
The DBMS MAC mode will be the mode that we investigate and analyze since 
it represents a multilevel database in which mandatory access control policy is enforced by 
the DBMS. 
2. 0s Mac Mode 
In 0s MAC mode, multiple, distinct, single-level databases are created, one for 
each sensitivity label. All mandatory access is mediated by the operating system on the 
operating system objects (i.e., files) in accordance with the overall security policy. Trusted 
ORACLE completely relies on the operating system to control access by Trusted ORACLE 
users to Trusted ORACLE objects. Multilevel tables can be created in 0s MAC mode even 
though a single, physical table cannot contain rows of more than one label. A logical 
“multilevel” table can by created by identically named tables at each sensitivity label, each 
with identical attributes. Figure 12 below, demonstrates how a multilevel database system 
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1. Physical Storage Structures 
The following sections briefly describe the physical structures of an Oracle 
database. 
a. Disk Organization 
Trusted ORACLE can be set up to utilize raw disk devices. A raw disk 
device, or raw disk partition, is a hardware device that is supported by a character device 
driver. A character device driver accesses the raw device through special files that are in 
the ldevlrdsk directory. These devices are not buffered by the HP-UX BLS kernel; data is 
transferred directly between the user’s buffers and the device. Raw devices allow l/O 
directly between the disk where the data is stored and the System Global Area of the 
Trusted ORACLE server. The overhead of the HP-UX BLS read ahead and file system is 
avoided, thus performance is enhanced because data is stored together on the raw device. 
b. Files 
The data files are the files which contain the actual database data. Database 
schema objects (i.e., tables, clusters, indexes) are physically stored in the data files 
allocated to the database. A data file cannot change in size once created, therefore as a 
database grows in size, new data files are added to accommodate the database. 
There are two or more redo files for every Oracle database. This set of redo 
files is known collectively as the “redo log.” The redo log’s primary purpose is to record 
all changes to the database. The information in the redo files is used only to recover the 
database from a system failure when the data has not been written to the data files. 
One control file exists for every Oracle database. Its primary purpose is to 
record the physical structure of the database, such as the database name, the names and 
locations of the database’s data files and redo files, and the time stamp of database creation. 
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functions such as reads and writes to the database files (i.e., DBWR-Database Writer, and 
LGWR-Log Writer) and other needed checks and locks. 
We have not ascertained from available documentation, what sensitivity 
level the daemons processes run at, or even if they have a sensitivity label at all. Other 
information (other than the Trusted ORACLE User’s Guide and technical overviews) 
would have to be obtained to find the answers to this question. 
d. Blocks, Extents, and Segments 
The operating system file system has a specific number of bytes which 
make up an operating system block. In HP-UX, the block size is usually 2K bytes (2048 
bytes). The Oracle database also recognizes, at its highest granularity level of storage, a 
data block (or page). Oracle allocates all its database space in blocks. This database block 
can be equal to the operating system block, or a multiple of it (e.g., a database block could 
be 2K or 4K bytes). 
At the next level of storage is the “extent.” An extent is a specific number 
of contiguous data blocks that are allocated for storing a specific type of information 
[ORAC92c]. For example, if more space is needed to store Oracle data files, then a data 
extent will be allocated for that data. If more space is needed for control information, then 
a control extent will be allocated. 
The highest level of logical database storage is the segment. A segment is 
a set of extents which stores a specific type of data structure, such as a database table’s data. 






Figure 15: Logical Structures from [ORAC92c] 
b. Schema Objects 
Most schema objects such as tables, clusters, and indexes are stored within 
a tablespace. The data for a table is stored in one or more of the tablespace’s data files. A 
cluster is an optional way of storing table data; it groups the tables that share the same data 
blocks together. This is because some tables share the same columns of identical data and 
are often used together. Clusters are used primarily to reduce VO and to reduce the amount 
of storage space needed by storing redundant data only once. 
A view is a tailor-made presentation of one or more tables and it is not 
stored within the tablespace or any other storage space. The only thing stored in a view is 
the view query or definition. When a view is invoked, it dynamically queries the 
appropriate tables stored in the database and then presents the data queried in a table-like 
format. (A view is often called a “virtual table.”) 
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which are used to make labels human-readable. An example of a numeric might be 100: 1, 
where 100 is the sensitivity level and 1 is the category. A short character format might be 
TS:A and a long format might be TOP SECRET:NATO. (More will be said about the 
Informix MAC features in the subsequent chapters.) 
2. Privileges and Roles 
A privilege in Oracle is a right to execute a particular type of SQL statement. 
Oracle divides privileges into distinct categories: system privileges, object privileges and 
MAC privileges (in Trusted ORACLE 7 DBMS MAC mode only.) System privileges allow 
users to perform particular system-wide functions, such as connecting to the database. 
Object privileges allow users to perform a specific action on a specific object, such as delete 
a row on the EMPLOYEE table. MAC privileges allow users to perform operations that 
circumvent MAC policy, such as reading higher level data. 
Each MAC privilege corresponds to a similar privilege in the underlying 
operating system. A user with granted MAC priviIeges in Trusted ORACLE cannot execute 
the command successfully unless the corresponding privilege has been granted in the 
operating system[ORACO2a). 
The three MAC privileges in Trusted ORACLE 7 DBMS MAC mode along with 
the needed HP-UX BLS privileges are shown in Table 7, below. 
TABLE 7: MAC PRIVILEGES IN DBMS MAC MODE [ORAC92B] 











Allows users to perform write operations 
on data at a lower label. 
Allows users to perform write operations 
on data at a higher label. 
Allows a user to perform read operations 
on data at a higher label. 
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VI. INFORMIX-ONLINE/SECURE ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter explains the configuration of the Informix DBMS. This chapter is our 
effort to explain the Informix DBMS structure so as to better prepare the reader for the 
subsequent comparative analysis of MAC policy enforcement. 
A. BACKGROUND 
Informix-OnLine/Secure is a multilevel secure relational database management 
system (RDBMS) for secure UNIX and compartmented mode workstation (CMW) 
platforms. OnLine/Secure comes in two different versions: B 1 and C2. For the purposes of 
our comparative analysis, we only analyzed the B 1 configuration. 
1. History 
Informix Software, Inc., is a subsidiary of Informix Corp., with corporate 
headquarters in Menlo Park, California. In September 1993, Informix’s OnLine/Secure 
became the first database to meet Class B 1 and Class C2 security levels, as specified by the 
NCSC (even though Final Evaluation Reports have yet to be made public as of this 
writing.) 
2. Platforms Supported 
Informix On-Line/Secure is available for Hewlett-Packard HP 9000 secure 
system, Sun Microsystems’ Sun CMW secure system, SCO, Digital Equipment, Sun 
SPARC, and Zenith [DATA94b]. 
B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
Informix-OnLine/Secure operates on a client/server model, where the client front end 
operates as a separate process from the server’s backend process. These two processes 
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Figure 16: Basic Architecture from [INF093a] 
C. DATABASE STRUCTURES 
Informix OnLine/Secure has additional structures and features relative to the standard 
Informix-Online RDBMS server. These new system capabilities are designed to meet the 
Class B 1 assurance level of the TCSEC [INFO93c]. 
1. Physical Storage Structures 
The following sections briefly describe the physical structures of the Informix- 
OnLine/Secure database. 
a. Disk Organization 
The Informix-OnLine/Secure database server is designed to perform its 
own disk management [INF093d]. Raw devices are identified, (by using a UNIX utility), 
to be used in the storage of all database data and system catalogs. Raw devices are usually 
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Shared memory is advantageous for several reasons, including the 
elimination of buffers for every process, (all database buffers are pooled), thus reducing 
disk I/O. Buffers are not reread, because only the most recent data page is in memory, and 
concurrency is enhanced because data is already in memory. 
Logical logs record all the changes to the database since the last backup of 
data was made. The logical log buffers within the shared memory area are used to 
temporarily hold data before it is written to the logical log disks. The physical log buffers 
hold a copy of a database page on the disk before the page is changed. These “before- 
images” allow the system to reconstruct the state of the disk at the time of the last 
checkpoint (i.e., points in time when the database server knows all databases are consistent) 
before the system failure occurred. 
Disk mirroring is the process of creating a mirror image of data in the 
database. This mirroring process requires the use of a primary database disk and a mirror 
disk. Database mirrors are optional in Informix-OnLine/Secure and are utilized for high 
availability. 
c. Chunks, Pages, and Extents 
The basic unit of storage in On-Line/Secure is the “chunk.” A chunk is a 
unit of disk storage that has been dedicated to the Informix RDBMS server. Chunks can be 
either raw devices, parts of raw devices (i.e., partitions), or files under the UNIX operating 
system. 
The page is the basic unit of disk I/O in the Informix database server. All 
space in every chunk is divided into pages and YO is done in units of whole pages. The size 
of the page is the same in all chunks used for tables and is set when the DBMS is installed. 
Informix OnLine/Secure allocates disk space on the raw devices in units 
called “extents.” Each extent is a block of physically contiguous pages from the space 
designated to contain the database. When database users add rows to a table, or new tables, 
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only pages at that level. If the table contained rows with three different sensitivity levels, 
there would be one bundlespace and three tblspaces for that table.[INF093a] (See Figure 













Trusted Computing Base 
Figure 18: Tblspaces and bundlespaces [INF093a] 
In addition to data pages (which represent the data held in the rows of the 
table), the tblspaces also contain pages for indexes. Binary large object (blob) column 
pages are also found in the tblspace, even though the actual blob data is contained in a 
blobspace (which is similar to a tblspace, except it holds only special blob data types, see 
below.) [INF093d] 
Blobs are data storage objects that have no maximum size, except for the 
limitations of the computer, (usually 23 bytes). Blob data types in lnformix-Online/ 
Secure are TEXT and BYTE. The TEXT data type is used for storing ASCII data, and the 
BYTE data type is used for any type of binary data.[INF093b] 
d. Schema Objects 
Schema objects in Informix-OnLine/Secure include databases, tables, 
rows, blobs, views, synonyms, indexes, contraints, and stored procedures. As previously 
77 
Sensitivity labels in Informix-OnLine/Secure are represented in four different 
formats: external, canonical (for System V MLS operating system only), internal, and tag. 
The external format is a human-readable label such as TOP SECRET:NATO; the internal 
format is a binary representation. (The canonical format is not used in the HP-UX BLS 
operating system.) The tag format is a 32 bit integer and is used extensively in the many 
operations performed on labels, such as label equality and label dominance. A tag is 
mapped to a human-readable label before exporting the sensitivity label to an output device 
such as a terminal or line printer, or it may be retrieved by a database user in the tag format. 
2. Privileges 
Privileges are used in Informix-OnLine/Secure to enforce discretionary access 
controls. There are three types of DAC privileges in Informix: database privileges, table 
privileges, and procedure privileges. All privileges are stored in the system catalog tables 
and any user with the “Connect” database privilege can query the system catalog tables to 
find out what privileges have been granted and to whom (assuming that this user’s session 
sensitivity level dominates the information in the databases and system tables.) [INF093c] 
Database privileges from lowest to highest are C (Connect privilege), R 
(Resource privilege), and D (Database Administrator privilege). The Database 
Administrator privilege is not the same as the Database System Administrator (DBSA) 
privilege, which is given only to the database administrator. The Database Administrator 
privilege as mentioned here, allows users to execute the DROP DATABASE (i.e., remove 
a database from the system) and create DATABASE (i.e,, establish a new database in the 
system) statements. 
Eight privileges are applied to tables, which give non-owners the privileges of 
the owner. Table 8, below, describes each table privilege. A “-” indicates that a user does 
not possess the privilege; a capital letter, such as “S” allows the user to GRANT the 
privilege to another user: a small letter “s” does not. 
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OnLine/Secure MAC or DAC policies. [INF093c] Discrete privileges allowed in 
lnforinix-OnLine/Secure are shown in Table 9. 
I PRIV-CANSETLEVEL 
TABLE 9: DISCRETE PRIVILEGES IN INFORMIX-ONLINE/SECURE 
Allows the user the ability to alter the session 
security level at which database operations occur 
I Privilege I Description I 
PRIV-CANSETIDENTITY Allows the user the ability to alter the user name 
under which database operations are performed 
The PRIV-CANSETLEVEL privilege enables a database user to successfully 
execute the SET SESSION LEVEL statement, thus effectively changing the session 
sensitivity level of the user. The PRIV-CANSETIDENTITY privilege enables the SET 
SESSION AUTHORIZATION statement so that a user can adopt the user name of any 
non-administrative user. (We will expound on these two privileges later in subsequent 
c: hap ter s .) 
i 
3. Auditing 
The auditing records produced by Informix-OnLine/Secure events are stored in 
the operating system audit records only. All use of discrete privileges is audited in 
Informix-OnLine/Secure as well as all DBSSO actions, initiation of the database system 
administrator utilities, and each initiation of a new OnLine/Secure session. [INF093b] 
4. Secure Administration Front End 
The DBSSO performs most of the security-related maintenance tasks using the 
secure administrator front end (SAFE). All auditing masks, MAC sensitivity labeling of 
objects, DAC privilege changes, and granting and revoking discrete privileges are done at 
the SAFE console. The SAFE provides an interface to the TCB and is part of the TCB. Only 
the DBSSO is allowed to perform operations at the SAFE. 
The next level is basically a repeat of the upper level, except that the TCSEC 
requirements have been decomposed into more granular requirements. This allows more 
detailed analysis and a better understanding of what the overall criteria is trying to relay. 
Likewise, if substantive interpretations existed within the TDl, they to would be 
decomposed. However, as the present TDI exists, no substantive decomposition could be 
made. 
The lowest level represents the decomposed criteria with individual “line item” 
interpretations thrown in. These “line item” interpretations are issued from time to time by 
the NCSC and published in the “Announce forum” of the Dockmaster bulletin board. We 
have only incorporated “line item” interpretations through September 1993, the time that 
the first DBMS (Informix-OnLine/Secure) completed substantive evaluation by NCSC. 
These interpretations are summaries and where found in INFOSEC Handbook: An 
Information Systems Security Reference Guide [ARCA93]. More recent interpretations 
would have to be accessed via the Dockmaster Announce forum. 
Based on this simple methodology our analysis was conducted. Once both products are 
matched against the decomposed criteria and “line item” interpretations, they will be 
compared. The comparison of DBMS products is found in Chapter X. 
A. TCSEC CRITERIA CHOSEN AND WHY 
Informix-OnLine/Secure 5.0 and Trusted Oracle 7.0 have both completed NCSC 
evaluation for Class B 1 - Labeled Protection. The TCSEC Class B 1 assurance level was 
discussed briefly in Chapter 111, and will not be further expanded upon here. However, it 
should be noted, that the Class Bl level of assurance is characterized chiefly by the 
requirements for labels on some subjects and objects, a suitable MAC policy, and a 
mandatory access control mechanism implemented to enforce access by these labeled 
subjects to objects. Other new requirements do exist, such as design specification and 
verification, and security testing. However, we have characterized Class B 1 assurance 
(labeled protection) as chiefly the implementation of a mandatory access control 
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1. Key to Understanding Decomposed Statement Notation 
The following table (See Table 10, below) constructed from [ARCA93], 
explains the notation used in the decomposed Class B 1 criteria. 
TABLE 10: DECOMPOSED CRITERIA NOTATION 
Italics 
I Notation I Explanation I 
Italicized text denotes a TCSEC interpretation. Each of these 
criterion is followed by an interpretation number that gener- 
ated it. 
Text in braces replaces original TCSEC text, often done to 
replace a pronoun with its reference. 1 I 
Text in brackets is repeated from a previous criterion or is new I " I text included for clarity. 
Ellipses show were TCSEC text is omitted, typically done 
when a single TCSEC sentence divides into multiple criteria. 
The TCSEC criteria interpretation summaries (in italics) are included adjacent 
to the specific criterion they affect. The NSA, over the years, has made a number of criteria 
interpretations (including discussion of alternate approaches, rationale, and presentation of 
the selected approach). The TCSEC criteria interpretations are independently numbered, 
with the assurance class, type interpretation, and the date the interpretation was published. 
For example, the LAB.iI is referenced by C1-CI-03-89, which means that this 
interpretation starts at Class C1, is a criteria interpretation (CI), and was issued by NCSC 
in March 1989. 
2. Labels 
Labels are attributes associated with some subjects and objects in a Class B1 
multilevel secure DBMS. These attributes represent the sensitivity or classification level of 
the subjects and the objects. The TCB is required to maintain these attributes for use by the 
access mediation mechanism. 
3. Label Integrity 
L 
Requirement Oracle DBMS HP-UX 0s Informix DBMS HP-UX 0s 
LI. 1 B B B B 
LI.2 B B D NA 
LI.3 B B D NA 
Label integrity is concerned chiefly with maintaining the correct label on the 
respective subjects and objects, and ensuring that the TCB protects these labels from 
modification. 
LI. 1 - Sensitivity labels shall accurately represent security levels of the specific 
subjects or objects with which they are associated. 
LI.2 - When exported by the TCB, sensitivity labels shall accurately and 
unambiguously represent the internal labels ... 
LI.3 - [When exported by the TCB, sensitivity labels] ... shall be associated with 
the information being exported. 
TABLE 12: LABEL INTEGRITY SUMMARY 
Trusted Oracle Platform Informix Platform I 
4. Exportation of Labeled Information 
From the TCB perspective, the exportation of labeled objects must maintain the 
integrity of the sensitivity label of the data with the 1/0 device which receives or transports 
the data out of the database. 
EL. I - The TCB shall designate each communication channel and 1/0 device as 
eith'er single-level or multilevel. 
EL.2 - Any change in {the single-level or multilevel) designation (of a 
communication channel 1 shall be done manually ... 
EL.3 - [Any change in {the single-level or multilevel} designation (of a 
communication channel}] shall be auditable by the TCB. 
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EM.i 1 - Mulitilevel tupe systems ure not required to store un object's sensitivity 
label on the sume tape us the object u s  long us this label cun be associated with the object 
in u trusted munner. (Cl -C1-05-84) 
EM.3 - [When the TCB exports an object to a multilevel YO device, the 
sensitivity label associated with that object shall also be exported] ... in the same form (i.e., 
machine-readable or human-readable form). 
EM.4 - When the TCB exports ... an object over a multilevel communication 
channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing 
between the sensitivity labels and the associated information that is sent ... 
E M S  - [When the TCB] ... imports [an object over a multilevel communication 
channel, the protocol used on that channel shall provide for the unambiguous pairing 
between the sensitivity labels and the associated information that is] ... received. 
TABLE 14: EXPORTATION TO MULTILEVEL DEVICES SUMMARY 
E M S  NM 0s NM 0s 
6. Exportation to Single-Level Devices 
The TCB must maintain single-level data exported to single-level devices by 
selecting the output device's sensitivity level based on the information being exported or 
imported. If data being exported or imported is SECRET, then the device chosen for the 
input/output should also be SECRET. 
HR0.3 - The TCB shall, by default, mark the top and bottom of each page of 
human-readable, paged, hardcopy output (e.g., line printer output) with human-readable 
sensitivity labels that properly2 represent the overall sensitivity of the output or that 
properly represent the sensitivity of the information on the page. 
HR0.4 - The TCB by default and in an appropriate manner, mark other forms of 
human-readable output (e.g., maps, graphics) with human-readable sensitivity labels that 
properly represent the sensitivity of the output. 
HR0.5 - Any override of { human-readable sensitivity label) marking defaults 
shall be auditable by the TCB. 
TABLE 16: LABELING HUMAN-READABLE OUTPUT SUMMARY 
8. Mandatory Access Control 
The mandatory access control requirements address how labeled subjects access 
labeled objects, and if the access rules, (as stated by the security policy), are enforced by 
the MAC mechanisms. 
MAC.l - The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control policy over all 
subjects ... under its control (e.g., processes...). 
MAC.2 - The TCB shall enforce a mandatory access control policy over all ... 
storage objects [under its control] (e.g .,... files, segments, devices). 
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TABLE 17: MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL SUMMARY 
C. TDI INTERPRETATIONS 
The Trusted Database Management System Interpretation of the Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (TDI) was completed and issued in April 1991. One would 
expect that this publication might contain particular answers to questions related to trusted 
DBMSs. However, the TDI did not provide us with the revealing answers that we sought. 
Section TC-5 of the TDI contains the “General Interpreted Requirements” for DBMS 
criteria. Often, the TDI added little other than a statement that the requirements of the 
TCSEC still applied. 
For example, we have focused exclusively on Class B1 level Labels and Mandatory 
Access Control requirements for our evaluation and comparison of products. The general 
interpreted requirements for labels as stated in the TDI is: 
This requirement applies as stated in the TCSEC to every TCB subset whose 
policy includes mandatory access control of it’s subjects to its objects. Any TCB 
subset whose policy does not include such mandatory access control is exempt from 
this requirement. 
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VIII. ORACLE ANALYSIS 
This chapter analyzes the Trusted ORACLE 7 against the TCSEC requirements (as 
decomposed in Chapter VII) for labels and mandatory access controls. We start by looking 
at the DBMS TCB component (i.e., database server software and user’s manuals), then 
proceed to the operating system TCB component. As discussed in Chapter VII, a 
requirement, as listed below, can be met in the DBMS TCB component, the operating 
system TCB component, both components, or it may not be meet or is not applicable. If 
users are required to meet this requirement, then a “U” will be placed in the respective 
columns associated with the requirement. After each requirement, we determine where the 
requirement was met, if in fact they were met. (See requirement summaries in Chapter VII.) 
A number of the individual decomposed TCSEC requirements are substantially the 
same (some are exactly the same). Therefore, we will refer the reader to specified 
requirements in lieu of discussing the same requirement in two different places. 
A. LABELS 
The decomposed label requirements are discussed below. 
1. LAB.1 Requirement 
Subjects are the active processes in the system, be they user subjects or daemon 
(background) subjects. Daemon subjects are maintained within the respective database 
server and operating system TCB components; each component has its own set of daemon 
subjects which are created by the 0s. Because we lack the appropriate documentation, we 
can not discuss daemon subjects specifically, and therefore will not analyze daemon 
subjects further. 
The maintenance of a user subject’s label begins with the creation of a username 
(i.e., account) for the Trusted ORACLE DBMS. All users must have a valid username 
before they can access the database. When an account is created for a new user on the 
Trusted ORACLE server, the account definition is stored as a row in a data dictionary table. 
maintaining the Protected Password database within the operating system). Because 
authentication is performed by the OS, the user name and password of the operating system 
is the one used within Trusted ORACLE to authenticate that the user logging into Oracle 
is in fact a valid user. For example, if a user with an operating system account named “Ron” 
is to connect to the Trusted ORACLE database, there must be a corresponding database 
user “Ron” in the ALL-USERS table within the database data dictionary. When “RON’ 
connects to the database (by typing “/”), the DBMS checks to see if there exists a valid user 
“Ron”; if so, then “Ron” can begin using the database. 
Therefore, both components (the 0s and the DBMS) are needed to maintain the 
user subject levels of the system and a “B” is given to each component in the summary 
tables in Chapter VII. 
2. LAB.2 Requirement 
As in the case of user accounts, all object definitions created in Trusted 
ORACLE are maintained as a row in a data dictionary. The objects found in Trusted 
ORACLE are database(s), tablespaces, rows, tables, views, indexes, clusters, sequences, 
synonyms, stored procedures and functions, packages, triggers, and rollback segments. The 
row for an object definition is labeled at the creator’s label when the object is created. The 
data dictionary is located in the SYSTEM tablespace within the database. This tablespace 
is made up of segments which correspond to a set number of operating system blocks. Each 
tablespace is labeled when it is created. All objects placed within a tablespace must 
dominate the label of the tablespace. You cannot store a lower level object in a higher level 
tablespace [ORAC92a]. 
The storage objects seen by the HP-UX BLS operating system (i.e., files, 
directories, devices, IPC objects, symbolic links, named pipes, processes, printer queues, 
and ptys) are created and maintained in the 0s. Files and directories are labeled 
individually, and are labeled in such a way that the access classes increase as you go down 
the tree. For example, the root directory is labeled at System Low and the directories and 
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5. LAB.4 Requirement 
The Trusted ORACLE DBMS utilizes an Import utility to import single level 
data, from an operating system file into the database. By default, the Import utility performs 
a single level import on a single level file. (A multilevel 0s file can also be imported as 
single level.)The user importing the data has the responsibility for logging into the system 
at the level to match the data’s label. Therefore, the user is responsible for meeting this 
requirement in the DBMS component. 
The HP-UX BLS operating system handles the importation of Trusted 
ORACLE database files from outside the system. HP-UX specifically defines two types of 
import media, labeled and unlabeled. An unlabeled medium is one whose data does not 
include sensitivity labels. The unlabeled medium typically has some external label (such as 
a stick-on label for magnetic tape) which tells the user how to handle the data on the 
medium. This unlabeled medium must then be loaded on a single-level device (associated 
with a single sensitivity label) which corresponds to the label on the medium. When the 
data on this medium is loaded into the system, it is labeled at the same sensitivity as that of 
the single-level device. 
Therefore, this requirement that the TCB shall request and receive the security 
level of the data, is accomplished directly by the authorized users of the system when they 
properly load tapes or floppy diskettes at the correctly labeled input device. Likewise, we 
label the HP-UX column of the summary table with a “U”, and place an “NA” in the DBMS 
column since the Trusted ORACLE Import utility is only good if the files to be imported 
were created by the Oracle export utility. 
6. LAB.5 Requirement 
There is no mention of auditing the import of non-labeled data in the Trusted 
ORACLE Administrator’s Guide [ORAC92a]. 
The HP-UX BLS operating system allows for the collection of audit data 
through the use of the Audit System Collection Mask. One of the audit capabilities of this 
The Export utility of Trusted ORACLE writes data from an Oracle database into 
operating system files in the Oracle binary format, either in the format of MLSLABEL or 
the RAW MLSLABEL [ORAC92a]. Within the Trusted ORACLE DBMS, the MLS 
keyword tells the Export utility whether or not to export labeling information along with 
the data a user is exporting. The default is Y (yes), which tells the Export utility to include 
the ALTER SESSION SET LABEL and the ROWLABEL pseudo-column. (The ALTER 
SESSION SET LABEL command ensures that when the export file is imported later, the 
imported objects are recreated at their original labels.) The ROWLABEL pseudo column 
values contain either of the two MLSLABEL datatypes. 
This requirement is met by both the DBMS and 0s TCB components, and is so 
reflected in the summary tables. (See table 12 on page 87) 
3. LI.3 Requirement 
As stated previously in LI.2, the sensitivity labels are associated with all objects 
created in the database (e.g., when a database table is created, the ROWLABEL pseudo- 
column, is automatically created as a special attribute) and tagged at the level of the user 
process creating the object. Therefore, when a multilevel export is conducted, the Export 
utility writes information to an operating system file, which includes labeling information 
for the data exported. 
This requirement is met by both the DBMS and 0s TCB components, and is so 
reflected in the summary tables. (See table 12 on page 87) 
C. EXPORTATION OF LABELED INFORMATION 
1. EL.1 Requirement 
The functions to designate each communication c.,annel anc I/O device are 
found within the underlying operating system, HP-UX BLS. The system administrator 
defines the security characteristics of each import/export device by placing the required 
information in the Device Assignment database. Every device that is to be used must have 
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Device Assignment 
Device Uame: ______________ 
Figure 20: Device Assignment Screen [HEWL92a] 
3. EL.3 Requirement 
All Administrator/operator actions are auditable in they are found in the Audit 
System Collection Mask [HEWLY2a]. The actions performed by the System 
Administrator, including the use of the devasgif command, are auditable. Therefore this 
requirement is met by the 0s TCB component. 
4. EL.4 Requirement 
The TCB maintains the I/O device labels in the Device Assignment Database, a 
part of the HP-UX BLS operating system files. Any change to these security levels are 
found in'the respective audit files or logs. Therefore this requirement is met by the 0s TCB 
component. 
5. EL.5 Requirement 
This decomposed requirement is almost the exact requirement as stated in EL.3. 
The system administrator's action, if selected in the audit mask, will be audited. Thus, any 
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numeric label format.) Therefore this requirement is met by both the DBMS and 0s TCB 
components. 
Figure 21: Hidden Directories in HP-UX BLS [HEWL92a] 
2. EM.2 Requirement 
The mltupe command of HP-UX BLS correctly achieves the purpose of this 
requirement by copying the files into the specified device together with path name, status 
information, and security attributes. The security attributes of the file contain the security 
label. The operating system handles all copying to the output device. Therefore this 
requirement is met by the 0s TCB component. 
3. EM.il Requirement 
The Trusted ORACLE Export utility can be used to export data out of the 
database by specifying the single level export option on the command line (MLS=N). If a 
file, created using the Export utility is later exported out of the system the tar and cpio 
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level of assurance [ATK194].) Therefore this requirement is meet by the 0s TCB 
component when the MaxSix package is installed. 
6. EMS Requirement 
This requirement is met by the MaxSix MLS network protocol. See EM.4 
requirement, above. Therefore this requirement is meet by the 0s TCB component. 
E. EXPORTATION TO SINGLE-LEVEL DEVICES 
1. ES.1 Requirement 
The HP-UX BLS operating system designates (through the operating system 
administrator) and maintains a device in the system as either single-level or multilevel. A 
single level device does not store labels with the files that it outputs. However, HP-UX BLS 
does specify a default sensitivity level for a single level device. This means that if a single 
level device is labeled, then only data at that level is exported through that device. Of course 
no labels will be associated with the exported files. Therefore this requirement is met by 
default in the operating system, and a NM is placed in the DBMS TCB component column. 
2. ES.2 Requirement 
The Trusted ORACLE Import utility is only good for files created with the 
Trusted ORACLE Export utility [ORAC92a]. By default, the Import utility performs a 
single level import on a single level export file. The user logs into the operating system at 
the level at which they want the information imported into the database. It is the 
responsibility of the user to know (based on the export file’s label or other information) at 
which level to import the data. Therefore, for the DBMS component of the TCB, we have 
labeled this requirement as “U”, for user responsibility. 
The tar and cpio programs of HP-UX BLS have been modified to import single- 
level media.These programs perform the appropriate checks against the Device 
Assignment database to ensure that the device used for import is in fact specified as single- 
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2. HR0.2  Requirement 
The HP-UX BLS prints the sensitivity level of the process executing the print 
command on the banner page of the printout. It usually appears in the same location on the 
banner page as the print-job detail (i.e., filename, process number, date, etc.). As stated in 
HRO. 1 ,  this banner page label is the same as the user’s session level. 
There is no mention of marking the end of all human-readable paged, hardcopy 
output with a trailer page. However, the last page printed (a body page) will have a human- 
readable sensitivity label printed on the top and bottom of the page. Therefore, this 
requirement is met by the 0s TCB. 
3. HR0.3 Requirement 
When the information is printed on the printer by the HP-UX BLS operating 
system, the banner page includes the sensitivity level of the process and each internal page 
includes the sensitivity level of the file that appears on that page. Internal pages (body 
pages), are labeled with the highest sensitivity level of the information that is printed on the 
page. 
Top and bottom labeling is characteristic only of the body pages of the printout. 
The banner page only prints the classification one time, usually near the print-job detail. 
There is no mistaking a banner page with a body page in HP-UX BLS, because the banner 
page is uniquely designed and standard. Therefore, this requirement is met by the 0s TCB. 
4. HR0.4 Requirement 
This requirement does not appear to be applicable in HP-UX BLS operating 
system. Labeling is supported on the line printer only. Labels are not supported on laser 
printers or plotters [HEWL92c]. In addition, labeling is not supported when the output is 
assigned a “landscape” orientation (i.e., the output is printed horizontally)[HEWL92c]. 
However, since HP-UX BLS does not support these printing options (it only prints line 
printer text) this requirement is not applicable to the 0s TCB or the Trusted ORACLE TCB 
components. 
requirements for details below.) Therefore, this requirement is met in both the DBMS TCB 
and the 0s TCB. 
2. MAC2 Requirement 
The Trusted ORACLE DBMS TCB component enforces a tnandatory access 
control policy over all objects controlled by the DBMS through the labels attached to each 
object. This MAC policy, based on reading objects and writing objects by subjects, is 
discussed in depth in the MAC.6 and MAC.7 requirements below. 
The HP-UX BLS TCB component maintains sensitivity labels on all objects 
controlled by the operating system. These objects include regular files, inter-process 
communication (IPC) objects, directories, special files, pipes, processes, and symbolic 
links. When objects are created, the HP-UX BLS system attaches security attributes to the 
objects. For example, when a file is created, the full pathname of the file, the file owner and 
group, the file mode and type, the sensitivity level, the potential and granted privilege sets, 
and the access control lists are stored in the File Control database. Everytime a process 
attempts to access the file, it must search the File Control database, check, and pass each 
parameter before access is granted. The MAC policy for reading and writing these objects 
is discussed in depth in the MAC.6 and MAC.7 requirements below. Therefore, this 
requirement is met in both the DBMS TCB and the 0s TCB. 
3. MAC.3 Requirement 
Within the Trusted ORACLE TCB component, subjects and objects are assigned 
sensitivity levels at the time they are created. Trusted ORACLE sensitivity labels for both 
subjects and objects consist of four components. See Figure 22 below. 
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and object’s sensitivity label before mandatory access in granted or denied, or if some other 
scheme or procedure is used to match and compare subject and object labels. 
HP-UX BLS enforces the MAC policy by making sure that the user process is 
cleared to access information from an object by comparing the sensitivity level of the 
process with the sensitivity level of the object. Therefore, this requirement is met in both 
the DBMS TCB and the 0s TCB components. 
5. M A C 5  Requirement 
Trusted ORACLE supports the range, size, and type of label formats provided 
by HP-UX BLS [ORAC92b]. 
HP-UX BLS has been designed to support many different configurations of 
sensitivity labels, with a “virtually unlimited capacity for the number of classifications and 
categories.”[HEWL92a] The maximum classification number is set to 16 by default; the 
maximum category number is set to 1024 by default. Both these defaults can be changed 
during system installation. [HEWL92a] Therefore, this requirement is met in both the 
DBMS TCB and the 0s TCB components. 
6. MAC.6 Requirement 
Trusted ORACLE provides the read operation by granting its subjects the 
SELECT operation. Before a database user can SELECT from an object, such as a table or 
view (thus reading the object), hidher label (clearance) must dominate the label of the 
object. The MAC rules for reading an object state, “users can read objects at their label and 
below; users cannot read objects at labels that they do not dominate.”[ORAC92a] 
The Trusted ORACLE rules above use the term “dominate”. Oracle defines 
dominate as a relationship between labels where one label dominates another if its 
classification is greater than or equal to that of the other label and its categories are a 
superset of the other’s categories (all categories are represented). This is essentially the 
satne definition as used in the TCSEC. 
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The user can log on the system at any sensitivity level up to hidher clearance, 
which is the highest sensitivity level the user has been cleared for. (The clearance assigned 
to a user is determined by personnel policies, commensurate with the level of 
trustworthiness of the user; the Authentication Administrator sets up the user’s clearance 
during system account creation.) In HP-UX BLS, the user’s login process is tagged with 
the Login User ID (LUID). This indelible tag can never be changed or modified, not even 
by a superuser with all the system privileges. For example, even if a system administrator 
jumps from one user account to another (e.g., when using the su command), the LUID of 
the system administrator is inherited by the new processes spawned from the su program. 
This provides absolute accountability and always traces who did what by examination of 
the LUID. Therefore, this requirement is tnet in the 0s TCB only. 
9. MAC.9 Requirement 
This requirement can be summarized to mean that system processes for users 
must be dominated by user’s clearance as found in the system’s I&A database. Based on 
available documentation, both the DBMS and the 0s adhere to this requirement. 
10. Additional MAC Comments 
The user’s LUID label (session level) is the sensitivity level that is used in 
Trusted ORACLE when subjects (processes) are created. No spawned process or new 
object created by the LUID process can exceed the sensitivity level of the LUID. The same 
is true when invoking special MAC privileges (WRITEDOWN, WRITEUP, READUP). 
When a database user connects to an Oracle database, he/she can connect at any sensitivity 
level up to hisher operating system clearance (I&A data). 
With respect to the MAC privileges, if a database user is connected at 
UNCLASSIFIED and has the READUP privilege, then he or she can read higher levels of 
information, but only up to (and equal to) hisher overall system clearance. The READUP 
privilege violates the simple security property of the Bell-LaPadula model and is used as a 
means to prevent the user from having to log out of the system and then log back in at a 
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IX. INFORMIX ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses the analysis of Informix-OnLine/Secure 5.0 against the TCSEC 
requirements (as decomposed in Chapter VII) for labels and the mandatory access controls. 
The configuration that we analyzed is the one where Informix-OnLine/Secure utilizes the 
“raw device storage”, thus circumventing most of the UNIX file system. 
Again, we start by looking at the DBMS TCB component (i.e., database server software 
and user’s manuals), then proceed to the operating system TCB. As discussed in Chapter 
VII, a requirement, as listed below, can be met in the DBMS TCB component, the operating 
system TCB component, both components, or it may not be meet or is not applicable. If 
user action is required to meet this requirement, then a “U” will be placed in the respective 
columns associated with the requirement. After each requirement, we determine where the 
requirement was meet, if in fact they were met at all. (See requirement summaries in 
Chapter VII.) 
A. LABELS 
1. LAB.1 Requirement 
For an operating system user to gain access to Informix-OnLine/Secure, he/she 
must be added to a new operating system group called “ix-users.” This requires the 
operating system administrator (OSA) to add this new group to the existing groups found 
in the HP-UX BLS implementation. In addition, the new database user’s clearance must at 
least equal (i.e., dominate) the minimum clearance established for the Informix-Online/ 
Secure database (which is usually referred to as DATALO). 
The database user’s clearance (i.e., sensitivity label) is actually maintained 
within the 0s tables (Protected Password database in HP-UX BLS). The Informix-OnLinel 
Secure DBMS has no username tables which it actually maintains for user subjects. 
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they must call the LABELTOSTRING function on the LABEL attribute of the respective 
table. 
LABEL 
TABLE 20: EXAMPLE OF A ROW TABLE FOR A PARTICULAR TABLE 
OBJECT 




I I I I 
2 
3 
Note that the LABEL and ROW-ID columns in both tables above, are invisible 
to standard users. 
A hypothetical sysprocedures table is shown in Figure 21, below. The 
sysprocedures table is a special table separate from the systables and contains only the 
stored procedure objects defined on the database. Because the label of the row in the 
sysprocedures table is the same as the level of the procedure to which it refers, the result of 
a query on the LABEL attribute returns the security level of the procedure [INF093c]. 








The storage objects seen by the HP-UX BLS operating system (i.e., files, 
directories, devices, IPC objects, symbolic links, named pipes, processes, printer queues, 
and ptys) are maintained within the 0s. Files and directories are labeled individually, and 
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Therefore, this requirement that the TCB shall request and receive the security 
level of the data, is accomplished directly by the authorized users of the system when they 
properly load tapes or floppy diskettes at the correctly labeled input device. This 
requirement is meet by the standard user, and we place a “U” in the DBMS column of the 
summary table, and a “NA” in the 0s column. 
6. LABS Requirement 
Standard users (not the DBSA) import unlabeled data using the dbimport 
command. The dbimport command is not audited, but other events associated with 
importing data (such as creating a new database, or locking of tables) are auditable. If a new 
database is not created, then this importing of non-labeled data may not be audited by 
Informix-OnLine/Secure. Therefore, this requirement for the auditing of non-labeled data 
will not have been met. 
All actions performed by the DBSA and the DBSSO users are audited by default. 
There are no audit masks for DBSA and DBSSO users [INF093b]. Only the DBSA can 
import data with OnLine/Secure internal MAC labeling from secondary storage media into 
an Informix-OnLine/Secure database. If the DBSA imports non-labeled data, then this 
requirement is met. However, if a standard user imports non-labeled data, then this action 
may not be audited by the system. Therefore, we place a “NM” in the DBMS column. 
The HP-UX BLS operating system allows for the collection of audit data 
through the use of the Audit System Collection Mask. One of the audit capabilities of this 
system mask is the auditing of subsystem events. Since import/export of data is a subsystem 
event (i.e., Tape), the HP-UX BLS system is capable of auditing all events associated with 
the import of non-labeled data. Therefore, we place an “0s” in the HP-UX 0s column of 
the summary tables for this requirement. 
121 
by row (under the LABEL attribute). These labels are unique to the specific 
implementation of the operating system; they are not necessarily the same or even 
understandable by other secure system implementations. Only the DBSA can export 
labeled data with OnLine/Secure internal MAC labeling to secondary storage media. 
This requirement is met by the DBMS component and a “D” is placed in the 
respective column and a “NA” in the 0s column. 
Device type Minimum 
C. EXPORTATION OF LABELED INFORMATION 
Maximum 
1. EL.] Requirement 
The Informix-OnLine/Secure user’s manual describes the desired sensitivity 
levels assigned to different devices as shown in Table 22:,  below. 
TABLE 22: SECURITY RANGES FOR DEVICES IN INFORMIX-ONLINE/ 
SECURE [INFO93B] 
Printer 
Tape drives for 
DBSA use 






Datahi with groups IX-DATA, IX-DBSA, 
and IX-DBSSO (when defined) 
Datahi with groups IX-DATA, IX-DBSA, 
and IX-DBSSO (when defined) 
Same as minimum 
Datahi 
standard users 
However, the functions to designate each communication channel and I/O 
device are found within the underlying operating system, HP-UX BLS. The system 
administrator defines the security characteristics of each impodexport device by placing 
the required information in the Device Assignment database. Every device that is to be used 
must have an entry in the Device Assignment database. Devices include terminals, line 
printers, and import/export devices such as tape drive systems. The operating system uses 
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4. EL.4 Requirement 
The HP-UX BLS maintains the YO device labels in the Device Assignment 
database, a part of the operating system file structure. Any change to these security levels 
are found in the respective audit files or logs.Therefore, this requirement is met in the 0s 
TCB component. 
5. EL.5 Requirement 
This requirement is the practically the same as EL.3 All operating system 
administrator/operator actions are auditable in they are found in the Audit System 
Collection Mask [HEWL92a]. The actions performed by the System Administrator. 
including the use of the devusgif command to change security levels of devices are 
auditable.Therefore, this requirement is met in the 0s TCB component. 
6. EL.i 1 Requirement 
Since all operating system administrator actions are auditable (if selected in the 
audit system collection mask), level changes of both single level and multilevel 
communications channels and I/O devices will be auditable. Though this interpretation 
states that multilevel communications channels and I/O devices are not required to be 
auditable, they will be in HP-UX BLS if the system administrator actions are selected in 
the Audit System Collection Mask because there is no granularity in the audit mechanism. 
(When the system administrator actions are audited, all actions associated with the system 
administrator are audited.)Therefore, this requirement is met in the 0s TCB component. 
D. EXPORTATION TO MULTILEVEL DEVICES 
1. EM.1 Requirement 
Only the DBSA is capable of exporting labeled Informix-OnLine/Secure 
objects. The DBSA can use five functions to export labeled data: the DB-MONITOR, the 
tbtupe -s, tbtupe -u, tbtupe -c or the thunloud commands. The data is written to the media 
12s 
they log-on the system.) Therefore, depending on the export being made (either to tape or 
to printer), this requirement is met by both the 0s and the DBMS TCB. 
5. EM.4 Requirement 
Informix-OnLine/Secure requires the use of the Informix-Star/Secure 
distributed client/server database product to enforce the database server’s security policy 
to remote client workstations. The minimum requirement for a secure Class B1 
configuration is MaxSix I .0 networking software. However, client workstations can be 
running any network configuration, ranging from unlabeled to MaxSix 2.x, as long as the 
network security officer can configure the MaxSix network databases properly [INF093fl. 
(For more information on MaxSix, See “EM.4 Requirement” on page 106.) 
Additionally, the HP-UX BLS network transports security attributes with data 
and extends a host’s access controls to the network subsystem so that a host can make 
access decisions using local policies as data traverses the network between communicating 
processes [HEWL92c].Therefore this requirement is meet by the 0s TCB component. 
6. E M S  Requirement 
This requirement is met by the MaxSix MLS network protocol. See EM.4 
requirement, above. Therefore this requirement is met by the 0s TCB component. 
E. EXPORTATION TO SINGLE-LEVEL DEVICES 
1. ES.1 Requirement 
The Informix-OnLine/Secure DBMS relies upon the operating system 
administrator to set the device security attributes in coordination with the DBSA 
[ INFO93 b] . 
The HP-UX BLS operating system designates and maintains (through the 
operating system administrator) a device in the system as either single-level or multilevel. 
A single level device does not store labels with the files that it outputs. However, HP-UX 
BLS does specify a default sensitivity level for a single level device. This means that if a 
127 
to ensure that the device used for export is in fact specified as single-level. The Informix- 
OnLine/Secure dbclxyort utility must confer with the HP-UX BLS Device Assignment 
database before exporting single-level data. Therefore, this requirement is can be met by 
both the 0s TCB component. 
F. LABELING HUMAN-READABLE OUTPUT 
Informix-OnLine/Secure provides the DB-Access utility which allows a database user 
to redirect the results of an SQL query (e.g., SELECT) from the screen to a printer, system 
file, or a program. By selecting the “Printer” option on the OUTPUT menu, the DB-Access 
utility sends the results of a query to the default printer. [INF093e] The actual printing of 
human-readable output is handled by the HP-UX BLS operating system. 
1. HRO.1 Requirement 
The operating system administrator only indirectly specifies the printable label 
names associated with exported security labels. Labels names are set-up when the 
sensitivity classifications and categories are defined for the system. Whenever objects are 
created (either database objects or operating system objects), they are labeled with the 
creating process’s sensitivity level. 
HP-UX BLS prints the sensitivity label of the process producing the output on 
the banner page of the printout. This is the sensitivity label that was typed when the user 
logged into the system. Therefore, this requirement is met by the 0s TCB component. 
2. HR0.2  Requirement 
The HP-UX BLS prints the sensitivity label of the process producing the output 
on the banner page of the printout. It usually appears in the same location on the banner 
page as the print-job detail. As stated in HRO. 1, this is the sensitivity label that was typed 
when the user logged into the system. 
There is no mention of marking the end of all human-readable paged, hardcopy 
output with a trailer page. However, the last page printed (a body page) will have a human- 
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which removes the filtering done on printed output. Both of these options are audited by 
the system. [HEWL92a] 
As a side note, both the special options to the lp command suppress the internal 
printout labeling features of HP-UX BLS. The assumption is that the banner page is still 
printed. Therefore, this requirement is met by the 0s TCB component. 
G. MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROL 
1. M A C 1  Requirement 
Subjects in Informix-OnLine/Secure are operating system processes that use On- 
Line/Secure. The DBMS server mandates that evegaccess to every piece of data (i.e., 
object) by all users (i.e., subjects) be checkedp’see if access is permissible, based on the 
/’ 
sensitivity label of the data and cl nce of the user. Informix-OnLine/Secure uses the 
same set of sensitivity labels that are available in HP-UX BLS. Therefore, there is no 
problem with comparison of subject and object labels when the DBMS assigns labels to 
objects based on the subject’s sensitivity level. (Specific access rules will be discussed in 
MAC.6 and MAC.7 requirements.) 
/ 
7
The HP-UX BLS TCB component maintains sensitivity labels on all subjects 
(active entities in the system, such as processes). When a user logs into the system, a login 
user ID (LUID) is attached to the user’s login process. The LUID points to the Protected 
Password database which contains the clearance level for that particular subject. (The 
clearance level is the highest sensitivity label allowed for that subject’s process). All 
processes spawned from this LUID process contain this same LUID with its associated 
clearance level. From these subject processes’ labels a mandatory access control policy, 
based on the Bell-LaPadula security model is enforced. (See the MAC.6 and MAC.7 
requirements for details below.) Therefore, this requirement is met in both the DBMS TCB 
and the 0s TCB components. 
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SECRET, called an access level, and zero or more categories, such as CRYPTO, NATO, 
and PROPRIETARY [INF093c]. lnformix-OnLine/Secure uses the same set of sensitivity 
labels that are available in HP-UX BLS. (The DBSA sets up labels in the DBMS to equal 
those in the 0s.) Therefore, there is no problem with comparison (i.e., label equality, label 
dominance, etc.) of subject and object labels when the DBMS assigns labels to objects 
based on the subject’s sensitivity level. 
The HP-UX BLS system specifically supports the US DOD method of 
classifying information according to hierarchial classification levels and non-hierarchial 
categories. Therefore, this requirement is met in both the DBMS TCB and the 0s TCB 
components. 
4. MAC.4 Requirement 
Subjects can access objects in lnformix-OnLine/Secure by comparing sensitivity 
labels (in their integer tag format) of objects and subjects. 
HP-UX BLS enforces the MAC policy by making sure that the user process is 
cleared to access information from an object by comparing the sensitivity level of the 
process with the sensitivity level of the object. Therefore, this requirement is met in both 
the DBMS TCB and the 0s TCB components. 
5. MAC5 Requirement 
lnformix-OnLine/Secure uses the same set of sensitivity labels that are available 
in the operating system [INF093c]. (See below.) 
HP-UX BLS has been designed to support many different configurations of 
sensitivity labels, with a “virtually unlimited capacity for the number of classifications and 
categories.”[HEWL92a] The maximum classification number is set to 16 by default; the 
maximum category number is set to 1024 by default. Both these defaults can be changed 
during system installation. [HEWL92a] Therefore, this requirement is met in both the 
DBMS TCB and the 0s TCB components. 
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The user can log on the system at any sensitivity level up to hisher clearance, 
which is the highest sensitivity level the user has been cleared for. (This clearance is 
established by the security policy outside the automated system environment and the 
Authentication Administrator sets it up during system account creation). In HP-UX BLS, 
the user’s login process is tagged with the Login User ID (LUID). This indelible tag can 
never be changed or modified, not even by a superuser with all the system privileges. For 
example, even if a system administrator jumps from one user account to another (e.g., when 
using the su cornmand), the LUID is still inherited by the new processes spawned from 
changes accounts. This provides absolute accountability and always traces who did what 
by examination of the LUID. Therefore, this requirement is met in the 0s TCB only. 
9. MAC.9 Requirement 
This requirement can be summarized to mean that system processes for users 
must be dominated by user’s clearance as found in the system’s I&A database. Based on 
available documentation, both the DBMS and the 0s adhere to this requirement. 
10. Additional MAC Comments 
Additionally, in lnformix-OnLine/Secure, trusted subjects or processes are 
created when invoking discrete privileges (PRIV-CANSETLEVEL and 
PRIV-CANSETIDENTITY). The PRIV-CANSETLEVEL allows a user to alter the 
session sensitivity level of the current session by invoking the SET SESSION LEVEL 
statement. The user can operate only at sensitivity levels that are dominated by the level of 
hisher original login session. The SET SESSION LEVEL allows the user, (by creating 
temporary tables and then changing session level), to change the object levels. This is a 
violation of the tranquility property of Bell-Lapadula model. 
The PRIV-CANSETIDENTITY discrete privilege allows users to circumvent 
the DAC protection for database objects by adopting the user name of any Informix- 
OnLine/Secure nonadministrative user. The user’s login ID and sensitivity level still 
determine what level of data the user holding this privilege can access. 
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X. COMPARISON OF TRUSTED ORACLE AND INFORMIX 
In this chapter we will list both the similarities and the differences of Trusted 
ORACLE 7 and Informix-OnLine/Secure 5.0 in the context of the TCSEC requirements 
examined in the two previous chapters. 
A. LABELS 
1. LAB.1 Requirement 
Trusted ORACLE maintains an ALL-USERS table for storing the database 
(user) subjects, by keeping a user’s name, clearance, and security profile. Informix- 
OnLine/Secure has no such comparable table, and exclusively uses the HP-UX BLS 
operating system Protected Password database to maintain its database users and their 
security clearances. Informix requires that three new groups be added to the HP-UX BLS 
groups: ix-data, ix-dbsso, and ix-dbsa. 
2. LAB.2 Requirement 
Trusted ORACLE 7.0 and Informix-OnLine/Secure 5.0 both maintain their data 
dictionaries by defining objects as rows in a system table. Each row (which defines a 
specific object) is labeled with the sensitivity level of the subject that created it and thus is 
the objects label. The objects in each system are similar in nature, as shown in Table 23, 
below. An “*” placed in a column means that specific product does not have a comparable 
object in the other product. 
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3. LAB.il Requirement 
There are no significant differences between Trusted ORACLE 7.0 and 
lnformix-OnLine/Secure 5.0 with respect to this requirement. 
4. LAB.3 Requirement 
There are no significant differences between Trusted ORACLE 7.0 and 
lnformix-OnLine/Secure 5.0 with respect to this requirement. Both database server systems 
use labeled objects and subjects with an extended version of the Bell-LaPadula model to 
control mandatory access between subjects to objects within the system. 
5. LAB.4 Requirement 
Trusted ORACLE uses the lmport utility to import a single level (or multilevel) 
0s file into the database. lnformix utilizes the dbimport command to do this function. 
Users are responsible to ensure that their session levels match the sensitivity of the data 
being imported. 
6. LABS Requirement 
When importing 0s files into their respective databases, neither Oracle nor 
lnformix audits the import utilities or commands. When the HP-UX BLS 0s imports files 
into the system (from outside the system), these actions are audited. 
B. LABEL INTEGRITY 
1. LI.1 Requirement 
Trusted ORACLE stores username accounts and schema objects as rows in a 
system table within the data dictionary and sensitivity labels are associated with these rows. 
lnformix-OnLine/Secure stores only schema objects, as rows in a system table and labels 
each row with the objects sensitivity label. Label integrity is maintained by the TCB. 
tbunloud command, to send multilevel data directly to an output device, using the -t device 
option. 
3. EM.il Requirement 
There are no substantial differences between Oracle and Informix with respect 
to this requirement. 
4. EM.3 Requirement 
Trusted ORACLE sends labeled objects to YO devices with their labels as either 
a MLSLABEL or RAW MLSLABEL data types. Informix sends labeled objects with 
labels as 4-byte integer tags. 
5. EM.4 Requirement and EMS Requirement 
The MaxSix secure networking package is required for Trusted ORACLE and 
Informix-OnLine/Secure. We believe that both products meet this requirement by utilizing 
the MaxSix protocol. 
E. EXPORTATION TO SINGLE-LEVEL DEVICES 
There are no substantial differences between Trusted ORACLE and Informix with 
respect to the requirements ES. 1 - ES.3. 
F. LABELING OF HUMAN-READABLE OUTPUT 
All requirements decomposed under this heading are met in the same way by both 
Trusted ORACLE and Informix-OnLine/Secure, because both DBMSs rely on the 
underlying operating system, HP-UX BLS exclusively to print human-readable output to 
the line printers. We found no mention that sensitivity labels are printed to the terminal 
screens. 
G. MANDATORY ACCESS CONTROLS 
With respect to the decomposed requirements, MAC.1 - MAC.9, there are no 
substantial differences between Trusted ORACLE and Informix-OnLine/Secure. The 
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privilege, which is allowed in the BLP model (but not in the extended-BLP which is the 
MAC model used in the three products), can be accomplished in the products by granting 
the appropriate special privileges, as indicated in Table 24. 
The PRIV-CANSETLEVEL discrete privilege in Informix-OnLine/Secure, aliows a 
database user to toggle back and forth between session levels without logging out and 
logging back into the system. Trusted ORACLE can accomplish this function by granting 
a user the MAC privileges (i.e., WRITEDOWN, READUP, WRITEUP). 
The PRIV-CANSETIDENTITY in Informix-OnLine/Secure (not shown in Table 24 
because, to our knowledge, Trusted ORACLE has no equivalent privilege) allows a 
database user to assume the identity of another database user, thus having access to that 
database user’s owned objects. This is a way for Informix to bypass discretionary access 
controls, without becoming a special user, such as the DBSA or the DBSSO. Additionally, 
we do not know which privilege in the underlying operating system, HP-UX BLS, 
coincides with the PRIV-CANSETIDENTITY Informix privilege. The only user in the 
operating system, who can bypass discretionary access controls on unowned objects, is 
usually the root account (i.e., superuser). Therefore, we can only assume, that when a 
database user is granted the PRIV-CANSETIDENTITY, they have a superuser account. 
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the Bell-LaPadula security model (i.e., subjects writing to objects must have equal 
sensitivity levels). Objects are stored in data files which can be stored in raw devices of the 
system controlled by the Oracle database server. 
Trusted ORACLE does employ trusted subjects when a user executes the MAC 
privilege WRITEDOWN. The WRITEDOWN MAC privilege clearly violates the Bell- 
Lapadula model (*-property), and is truly a trusted subject as defined by [GASSXtl]. The 
WRITEDOWN privilege is utilized when conducting a full database import and a high- 
level (i.e, system high) process is allowed to write data to the database at its actual label, 
which can be lower than system high level. 
The READUP MAC privilege of Trusted ORACLE is used by database users to 
read objects at higher levels than their session level. (This privilege violates the simple 
security property of the Bell-LaPadula model.) However, this privilege is limited to reading 
objects with a sensitivity label dominated by the overall clearance of the user, as defined in 
the operating system’s Protected Password database. The READUP privilege only 
overrides the user’s session sensitivity level, not the user’s system clearance level. 
In addition, the CREATE TABLE AS command allows a standard user with no 
MAC privileges to change hisher table(s) from one sensitivity label to another (up to their 
DBMS sensitivity label) [ORAC92a].This is actually done by creating a new table (with all 
the same attributes as the old table) at a new sensitivity level, and then copying all data from 
the old table into the new table. The new table’s definition is the exact same as the old table, 
just with a new sensitivity label. The old table is then dropped from the database. 
Any user in Trusted ORACLE can change the labels of hisher rows within their 
owned tables at any time. This raises a serious concern about the persistence of row and 
table object labels. The Bell-LaPadula Model implies the tranquility contraint that object 
access classes cannot change; object labels must remain unchanged through their lifetime. 
Trusted ORACLE circumvents this tranquility restriction, carefully (and apparently 
purposely), by not defining rows as objects. Instead, they call the changing of a row’s 
ROWLABEL pseudo-column, the “reclassifying of data.” [ORAC92a] To reclassify data 
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3. Limitations of Research 
A thorough, technical analysis was not possible with only public documentation. 
We acquired the following types of documentation for our research: 
Technical Overviews and Briefs 
Trusted Facility Manuals 
Administrator User’s Guides 
Security Features User’s Guides 
other public documents 
These types of documents are insufficient to determine if products can meet the 
TCSEC requirements. These types of manuals and guides do not focus on the security 
features as they relate to the TCSEC and there is little or no discussion on the design of the 
system’s security mechanisms. (The organization of the documents do not coincide, 
structurally with the TCSEC.) 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. MAC Downgrade Policy 
All system administrators of a Trusted ORACLE or an Informix-OnLine/Secure 
database should develop a security policy for downgrading object labels. We recommend 
that only the system security officer in conjunction with the DBA be allowed to make 
object level changes, following a security policy for reclassifying data.(Separation of 
privilege would require both administrators to agree on object label changes before an 
actual change can be made in the system.) Specific rules with respect to this policy, cannot 
be defined beforehand, but a generic policy addressing the labeling and downgrading of 
objects should be established. This will allow users some notion of how to label objects and 
how to reclassify objects once they are defined. All reclassifying of data should be audited 
by default with no override capabilities. 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research in this area could lead to a comprehensive evaluation handbook for the 
analysis of DBMSs. Upon the release of the Final Evaluation Reports by the NCSC for 
Trusted ORACLE and Informix-OnLine/Secure, study can continue to correlate the 
findings by NCSC with the findings of this research. Our analysis method can be expanded 
to cover all the TCSEC requirements, not just the MAC and labeling requirements. 
A number of research questions have been posited over the years concerning the 
evaluation of software products which are “layered” or placed on top of trusted (previously 
evaluated) operating systems, such as DBMSs. Such questions are: 
manages resources, whereas a DBMS manages information. What is the relationship‘! 
Are TCB subset architectures, in the context of DBMSs, amenable to incremental 
evaluation (i.e., evaluating the application only without evaluating the underlying 
TCB subset [typically the operating system], which has already been successfully 
evaluated).[CHOK92] The basis for this question is the hope that the underlying 
operating system would not have to be reevaluated in order to evaluate the DBMS 
software product. 
Can or should the TCSEC, which was written initially for operating systems and 
their evaluations, be used for the evaluations of other systems, such as DBMS? Some 
authors have argued, that different criteria (criteria other than the TCSEC) should be 
developed for DBMS products. [GRAU90] 
Can a DBMS be evaluated like an operating system? An operating system 
Future research in these areas can help determine the answers to these questions. 
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